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The Effect of Globalization and Legal Environment on Voluntary Disclosure 
 
 
Abstract 
 We examine how interactions with foreign capital, product, and labor markets affect 
the disclosure practices of non-U.S. multinational firms.  Drawing on literature related to 
multinationals, country-level legal institutions, and accounting disclosures, we expect that the 
relation between globalization and voluntary disclosure will be conditioned on the legal 
environment in a firm’s home country.  Specifically, while firms from strong legal 
environment countries (e.g., common law countries) already face pressure for good 
disclosure, globalization can increase the benefits associated with good disclosure for firms 
from weak legal environments (e.g., civil law countries).  We use a self-constructed 
voluntary disclosure index and hand-collected disclosure and foreign activity data for 643 
non-U.S. firms from 30 countries.  We find a significant interaction between globalization 
and legal environment.  This indicates that for the same level of globalization, there is more 
voluntary disclosure for firms based in weak legal environments.  Our results suggest that 
globalization is an important variable that has been overlooked in much of the previous 
cross-country research.  
 
 
Kimberly Webb, Steven F. Cahan, and Jerry Sun. 2008. The International Journal of 
Accounting, 43(3), 219-245.  Post-print
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1.  Introduction 
There is an expanding literature that examines whether a country’s legal and judicial 
institutions affect disclosures and other accounting properties across countries (e.g., Ball, 
Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Jaggi & Low, 2000; Hung, 2001, Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Hope, 
2003a, 2003b; Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006).  However, 
for the most part, these studies do not consider the role of globalization, i.e., they ignore the 
fact that many firms operate and raise funds in multiple countries.  Thus, as firms and 
markets become increasingly global, there is a need to better understand how globalization 
impacts on the fundamental effects of legal environments.  For example, one important 
question is whether globalization will accelerate convergence of corporate governance 
systems of firms around the world (e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). 
In this paper, we examine how a firm’s voluntary disclosures are affected by its 
degree of international diversification and by the legal environment in its home country.  We 
argue that while voluntary disclosures should increase with globalization, the effect will be 
larger for firms based in countries with weak legal environments than for firms based in 
countries with strong legal environments.  That is, we expect that the former will provide 
more disclosures as a result of their weak legal and judicial institutions at home.  Using a 
sample of 643 non-U.S. firms from 30 countries, a self-constructed index of voluntary 
disclosure, and hand-collected disclosure and foreign activity data, we find evidence that is 
consistent with our expectations – in particular, we find a significant interaction between 
globalization and legal environment.  Specifically, the effect of globalization on voluntary 
disclosures is larger for firms from civil law or low investor protection countries.   
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To our knowledge, we are the first to examine the interaction between globalization 
and legal environment.  In doing so, our study contributes to several areas of research.  First, 
we contribute to the on-going debate on whether globalization will drive firms to adopt the 
same corporate governance systems (e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001) or whether 
corporate governance systems are path dependent and are unlikely to change even as 
globalization occurs (e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, 1999).  We find that firms from weak investor 
protection countries that adopt a globalization strategy increase voluntary disclosures the 
most.  This suggests that globalization drives convergence by improving the governance of 
firms that are not supported by strong legal and judicial institutions at home. 
Second, we contribute to an emerging line of research that examines the accounting 
consequences of foreign firms interacting with U.S. markets.  For example, Lang, Raedy, and 
Yetman (2003) find that non-U.S. firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. have earnings 
properties that are more like U.S. firms compared to other firms in their home countries, 
Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller (2004) find a positive relation between U.S. GAAP 
conformity of non-U.S. firms and ownership by U.S. institutions, and Khanna, Palepu, and 
Srinivasan (2004) find that non-U.S. firms are more likely to use U.S. disclosure practices as 
involvement with U.S. markets increases.  Since we do not limit our tests to interactions with 
U.S. markets, we provide more general evidence on the effects of interacting with foreign 
markets. 
Third, we add to the growing literature that uses country-level institutional features, 
such as legal origin or investor protection, to explain cross-country differences in accounting 
properties.  For example, Jaggi and Low (2000), Hope (2003b), Francis, Khurana, and 
Pereira (2005) find that country-level institutional factors matter in explaining disclosure 
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levels.  Further, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) find that earnings management is related 
to a country’s investor protection.  Ball et al. (2000) find that the accounting properties of 
timeliness and conservatism vary between common law and civil law countries.  Ball et al. 
(2003) find that country-level institutional factors can dominate accounting standards, and 
Hope (2003a) finds that a measure of legal enforcement is related to analysts’ forecast 
accuracy.  However, none of the prior studies have considered how globalization affects their 
results.  Our results suggest that globalization may be an omitted variable in these tests. 
Fourth, we contribute to the voluntary disclosure literature.  Most prior international 
studies have used the CIFAR scores or, more recently, the transparency and disclosure index 
developed by S&P.  However, as Bushee (2004) suggests, these indexes are not without 
problems, and he notes that “the biggest payoff to future researchers will likely come to those 
who construct their own disclosure indexes” (p. 524) and use hand collected data.  We use a 
voluntary disclosure index based on Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2007) and hand-collect 
disclosure data for 643 firms from 30 countries.  This allows us to provide more powerful 
tests of firm-specific disclosure incentives and allows us to complement prior studies that use 
broad-based, externally-developed disclosure indexes.1 
Fifth, we contribute to the literature on globalization and multinational firms.  Most of 
this research focuses on U.S. multinationals.  For example, Duru and Reeb (2002) find that in 
the U.S. analysts’ forecast accuracy is inversely related to globalization.  Callen, Hope, and 
Segal (2005) find that for U.S. multinationals, the variance of unexpected stock returns is 
related more closely to domestic earnings than foreign earnings.  One reason why prior 
studies have not considered the effects of globalization for non-U.S. firms is that foreign 
                                                 
1
  See Bushee (2004) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the different types of 
disclosure indexes. 
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activity data for non-U.S. firms are not widely available on databases like Compustat Global.  
Here, we augment data from Compustat with hand-collected data on foreign activity.  Thus, 
we are able to examine the effects of globalization for a large, diverse sample of non-U.S. 
firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops hypotheses.  
Section 3 describes the sample, model and variables used in the study.  Section 4 provides 
descriptive statistics and discusses the results of the empirical tests.  Section 5 is a 
conclusion.  
 
2.  Background and hypotheses 
 Several recent studies examine interactions with U.S. markets.  Lang et al. (2003) 
examine the accounting properties of non-U.S. firms that are listed in the U.S.  Compared to 
firms that are not cross-listed, they find cross-listed firms are less likely to manage earnings 
and are more likely to have earnings that are timely and conservative.  Their results also 
indicate that some of the differences arise in the post cross-listing period.  Bradshaw et al. 
(2004) examine whether conformity with U.S. GAAP affects the level of U.S. institutional 
ownership for non-U.S. firms.  They rate U.S. GAAP conformity by examining 13 
accounting method choices and find that greater levels (changes) of U.S. GAAP conformity 
are related to greater U.S. institutional ownership.   
Khanna et al. (2004) argue that non-U.S. firms with more involvement in U.S. capital, 
product, and labor markets will adopt U.S. disclosure practices.  They use a variety of firm-
level and country-level variables to proxy for involvement in U.S. markets.2  Further, they 
                                                 
2
  Khanna et al. (2004) use a U.S. listing variable and country-level variables related to U.S. equity 
investment and U.S. direct investment to measure involvement in U.S. capital markets, firm-level measures of 
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use S&P’s transparency and disclosure index which is based on a checklist of 98 disclosure 
items.  They argue that higher scores represent more conformity with U.S. disclosure 
practices, and using a sample of 794 firms from 24 countries, they find positive relations 
between most of their U.S. market measures and the S&P disclosure scores.  Khanna et al. 
(2004) is important because it shows that the capital market is not the only market that may 
affect a multinational firm’s disclosure policy.  Instead, product market and labor market 
forces also can exert pressure on firms to increase disclosures even in the absence of capital 
market forces. 
 Together, these studies suggest that interactions by foreign firms with capital, 
product, and labor markets in the U.S. matter.  Our intention is to take a broader perspective 
– we examine the effects of interactions with markets around the world.  We argue that firms 
may disclose more as globalization increases because exposure to the more capital, product, 
or labor markets increases the demand for better disclosure and better governance.3  
However, we also argue that this effect will be most pronounced for firms based in weak 
legal environments since these firms face weak demand for good disclosure at home and 
because their disclosures are likely to be viewed as less credible.  Thus, we examine whether 
there is an interaction between globalization and legal environment that affects disclosure. 
We draw on several streams of literature to explain why expansion into foreign 
markets can increase the demand for more disclosure.  Though these studies focus on capital 
                                                                                                                                                       
U.S. exports and U.S. operations and a country-level measure of U.S. trade to proxy for U.S. product market 
interactions, and a country-level measure of business travel to the U.S. to represent U.S. labor market 
involvement.   
3
  Globalization could also affect disclosure through firm complexity.  That is, global firms may disclose 
more because they have more complex operations or financing arrangements that require greater disclosure.  We 
design our tests to minimize this complexity effect.  Specifically, rather than examine disclosures that are 
specifically about international activity (e.g., geographic segment disclosures), we use a measure of overall 
disclosure. 
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market forces, similar to Khanna et al. (2004), we see these arguments extending to the 
product and labor markets as well. 
Prior literature on the home bias suggests that investors overweight (underweight) 
their portfolios with firms based in their home (foreign) countries.  Merton’s (1987) analysis 
suggests that information costs can create indirect barriers that lead investors to hold stocks 
they are familiar with, and prior research suggests that the home bias can arise from 
insufficient or inadequate information about the firm (e.g., Kang & Stulz, 1997; Ahearne, 
Griever, & Warnock, 2004; Bradshaw et al., 2004; Chan, Covrig, & Ng, 2005).  This 
suggests that expansion into new markets creates information issues. 
Further, there is evidence that suggests that investors and analysts have difficulty in 
interpreting or understanding information about multinational firms.  Duru and Reeb (2002) 
find that analysts’ forecast accuracy for U.S. firms is negatively related to their globalization, 
and they interpret this as evidence that the forecasting task is more complex when foreign 
operations are more extensive.  Thomas (1999) and Callen et al. (2005) find that U.S. 
investors place less value on foreign earnings relative to domestic earnings.  These authors 
suggest that their results might be due to poor disclosures.  
Analytical research (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983) 
suggests that firms have incentives to improve the information set available to investors 
because this can reduce information asymmetry, and can increase liquidity and lower the cost 
of capital.  At a practical level, McKinsey (2002) reports that 70% of global investors rate 
accounting disclosures as being important when evaluating foreign investments.  Also, 
empirical evidence suggests that better financial reporting and disclosure can help in an 
international context.  For example, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) find that analysts’ forecast 
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accuracy is higher after firms adopt IAS, and Hope (2003a) finds that analysts’ forecast 
accuracy improves when firm-level disclosure increases.  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find 
that German firms switching to U.S. GAAP reporting have lower information asymmetry 
than firms that continue to report under German GAAP, which is a lower disclosure reporting 
regime.   
While this suggests that multinational firms would have incentive to voluntarily 
disclose more information, firms may have proprietary reasons for not disclosing information 
(e.g., Dye, 1986).  Though they do not consider foreign segment information, Botosan and 
Stanford (2005) find that, compared to segment disclosures under SFAS 131, some firms 
used the latitude provided in SFAS 14 to hide information about operations in industries with 
less competition.  They conclude that firms used SFAS 14 to protect profits in these 
industries from new competition.  Similarly, multinational firms may have incentive to 
withhold or obfuscate information related to their profitable foreign activities. 
The preceding arguments are largely couched in terms of capital markets, but the 
main issue – information asymmetry – also applies to users in the product and labor markets, 
and as Khanna et al. (2004) suggest, interactions with foreign product and labor markets can 
also create a demand for information and better disclosure from multinational firms.  For 
example, they argue that customers require financial information to evaluate a foreign firm’s 
long-term viability, and suppliers use financial statements in evaluating a foreign firm’s 
creditworthiness.  Likewise, employees and prospective employees can use financial 
disclosures in assessing employment opportunities with a foreign firm.  These arguments are 
supported by Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) who argue that implicit contracts can 
affect firm’s accounting choices.  These implicit contracts are relational contracts that depend 
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on the firm’s reputation.  Given the unfamiliarity of firms when they enter foreign product or 
capital markets, multinational firms have incentives to provide additional information in 
order to establish and maintain a reputation.  This can reduce costs associated with these 
relational contracts in the long-run.    
Whether voluntary disclosure is increasing in globalization is an empirical question.4  
Thus, we examine the following hypothesis:  
H1.  The level of voluntary disclosure for a firm is positively associated with its level of 
globalization. 
A second, separate strand of literature examines the effects of country-level legal and 
judicial institutions on disclosures and other accounting properties (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; 
Jaggi & Low, 2000; Hope, 2003a, 2003b; Leuz et al., 2003; Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 
2004)).  This literature builds on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 
1998) who find that common law countries have stronger investor rights.  However, a 
shortcoming of the prior cross-country research is that it largely ignores the role of 
globalization.  These studies implicitly assume that accounting outputs are affected only by 
the legal environment in a firm’s home country.  One exception is Khanna et al. (2004), but 
their results are specific to U.S. markets and they do not consider the more complex issue of 
how incentives arising from foreign market involvement and the legal environment interact.  
Recently, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) argue that firms raising funds in global 
capital markets have incentives to improve their corporate governance.  Further, they suggest 
that as corporate governance improves, the influence of country-level investor protection 
diminishes and this change will be more dramatic for firms based in countries with weak 
                                                 
4
  Gray, Meek, and Roberts (1995) and Cahan, Rahman, and Perera (2005) provide some evidence on this 
issue.  However, neither of these studies control for legal environment in their tests.   
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legal systems.  Their view is based on the argument that firms in weak legal environments do 
not have incentive to improve their corporate governance because the benefits of doing so are 
small.  For example, one of the benefits of improved disclosure is that it can reduce the cost 
of capital when raising equity.  However, in countries with weak legal environments, equity 
markets are small so firms have limited opportunities to access equity funding.  In contrast, in 
countries with strong legal systems, equity markets are well developed which gives firms in 
those countries more opportunities to use equity funding and, hence, more incentives to 
improve corporate governance including disclosure.  Global markets give firms access to not 
only wider financial markets but also to bigger product and labor markets.  This is 
particularly important for firms from weak legal environments because it increases the 
benefits of good governance and good disclosure.  On the other hand, for firms from strong 
legal environment countries, accessing global markets will have less impact since these firms 
already have incentives to have good governance because of the pressures they face at home.   
Durnev and Kim (2005) make a similar prediction although they focus on external 
financing (which could include domestic or foreign financing).  However, their arguments 
are also instructive.  They contend that external financing needs will cause firms to improve 
their corporate governance, but they expect this effect will be more pronounced in weak legal 
environments.  They argue that in weak legal regimes, investors have a lack of trust because 
they believe their rights will not be protected, and this leads to a higher cost of capital.  Thus, 
firms raising external financing have incentives to maintain high quality governance systems 
in order to gain investors’ trust.  While their argument is conceptually different from Doidge 
et al.’s (2004), both views suggest that raising funds in global capital markets can have a 
bigger effect on the disclosures of firms that originate in weak legal environments. 
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Durnev and Kim’s (2005) work also provides a link with the implicit contracts that 
characterize product and labor markets.  As discussed, implicit contracts depend on 
reputation.  Prior research establishes that accounting quality is generally lower when legal 
and judicial institutions are weak.  For example, there is evidence that disclosure levels are 
lower (e.g., Jaggi & Low, 2000; Hope, 2003b), earnings are more likely to be managed (Leuz 
et al., 2003), and earnings are less timely and less conservative (Ball et al., 2000) in weak 
legal environments.  Thus, product and labor market participants such as customers, 
suppliers, and employees are likely to have less faith in the accounting disclosure of firms 
domiciled in weak legal regimes.  Similar to the way that better disclosures can help gain the 
trust of investors, they may also help gain the trust of product and labor market participants, 
and increase the value of the firm’s implicit contracts. 
Neither Doidge et al. (2004) or Durnev and Kim (2004) provide a test of the 
interaction between globalization and legal environments.  Doidge et al.’s (2004) tests are 
designed to examine the relative contributions of country- and firm-level characteristics in 
explaining corporate governance.  Thus, they do not include an interaction term.  Durnev and 
Kim (2004) examine the interaction between external financing needs and legal environment, 
but external financing could be financed through domestic or foreign sources.5  Further, they 
do not consider effect of foreign operations at all.   
Thus, our main objective is to examine whether there is an interaction between 
globalization and legal environment that affects voluntary disclosures.  Formally, we 
hypothesize: 
                                                 
5
  In a somewhat similar test, Francis et al. (2005) examine the possibility of an interaction between their 
external financing measure and their country-level variables.  They do not find a significant interaction effect 
(to their surprise, see p. 1144). 
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H2.  The effect of globalization on voluntary disclosure is greater for firms based in countries 
with weak legal environments than for firms based in countries with strong legal 
environments. 
 
3.  Research design 
3.1. Voluntary disclosures 
 We use a self-constructed measure of voluntary disclosures based on Francis et al. 
(2007).  This is in contrast to other recent cross-country studies that use externally developed 
measures of total disclosures, e.g., Hope (2003b) who uses CIFAR ratings and Khanna et al. 
(2004) who use S&P’s transparency and disclosure scores.  Though externally developed 
indexes have the advantage of being objective and comprehensive, they also have 
disadvantages (e.g., Bushee, 2004; Francis et al., 2007).  For example, both indexes capture 
total disclosures that include both mandatory and voluntary disclosures.  Further, externally 
developed indexes offer lower construct validity since they were not created with a specific 
research question in mind, and they can restrict the researcher to non-representative samples 
that may be motivated by commercial interests of the organization that prepared the index.  
Bushee (2004) argues that using a self-constructed index and hand-collected data is likely to 
yield bigger payoffs for future researchers who want to examine disclosures internationally.  
In our case, using a self-constructed index allows us to isolate voluntary disclosures and more 
closely examine firm-level reporting incentives for a relatively large and diverse sample of 
international firms.  
 Francis et al. (2007) develop a voluntary disclosure index for U.S. firms in a study 
examining the effect of voluntary disclosure on the cost of capital.  While they base their 
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index on Botosan (1997), they note that their index differs in two important ways.  First, they 
only consider ‘disclosure categories and elements which are clearly voluntary in nature’ 
(Francis et al., 2007, 12), and second, they expand Botosan’s index to include non-GAAP 
measures of financial performance (e.g., free cash flow, residual income).  Francis et al. 
(2007) rate their sample firms based on 25 items divided into four categories, i.e., historical 
results, other financial measures, non-financial measures, and projected information, and 
examine whether the disclosure scores are related to the firm’s cost of capital.  However, they 
find that their results are driven by disclosure scores in two of these categories – other 
financial measures and non-financial measures.  As a result, we use these two categories to 
measure voluntary disclosures.   
 We recognize that Francis et al. (2007) developed their index for U.S. firms.  We use 
their index for a sample of non-U.S. firms because our goal is to identify a set of disclosures 
that is voluntary in all countries and that has economic significance.  Since the U.S. is 
generally seen as having the more rigorous reporting and disclosure standards in the world 
(e.g., Reese & Weisbach, 2002), items that are disclosed voluntarily in the U.S. are very 
likely to be voluntary in other countries as well.6  Further, Francis et al. (2007) show that the 
items that they disclose affect the firm’s cost of capital.  This indicates that the items they 
include in their index have economic significance; in other words, these disclosures are not 
trivial. 
                                                 
6
   Nonetheless, similar to Francis et al. (2007), we still conduct exhaustive checks to ensure that each 
disclosure item is actually voluntary in every country in our sample using the following procedure.  For every 
country and for every disclosure item, we conducted three Google searches using the following key words: (1) 
‘accounting standards [country name] [disclosure item]’, (2) ‘company disclosure requirements [country name] 
[disclosure item]’, and (3) ‘stock exchange listing requirements disclosure [country name] [disclosure item]’.  
We also conducted two sets of further searches – one for international accounting standards (i.e., ‘international 
accounting standards [disclosure item]’) and one for European Union reporting requirements (i.e., ‘European 
Union company reporting requirements [disclosure item]’).  We did not identify any instances where one of our 
disclosure items was required. 
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We score the 2003 annual reports for our sample firms using an 11 items index that 
includes three other financial measures and eight non-financial measures.  Table 1 lists these 
items.7  Following Francis et al. (2007), we rate each item on a binary scale.  If a firm 
discloses an item, we give it a score of 1 for that item.  We refer to these scores as item 
scores.  Thus, a firm’s voluntary disclosure score, VDisc, is the sum of the 11 item scores. 
Insert Table 1 here 
 Additionally, we employ a modified version of Francis et al.’s (2007) rating system.  
For each of the 11 items, we also give every firm a quality score based on the extent and 
richness of their disclosures.  We rate the quality of the disclosure for each item as low, 
medium, or high.8  If the disclosure is rated as ‘low’, it is given an item score of 1; if it is 
rated ‘medium’, it is given an item score of 2; and if it is rated ‘high’, it is given an item 
score of 3 (as before, a zero score is given for non-disclosure).  We define VDiscQ as the sum 
of the quality scores for each of the 11 disclosure items.  Since scoring VDiscQ require some 
subjectivity, we believe the results for VDiscQ should be interpreted in conjunction with 
VDisc.  
                                                 
7
  Our 11-item index is similar in terms of number of items to other international studies that use self 
constructed indexes.  For example, Hung (2001) uses an 11-item index related to the use of accrual accounting, 
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) use a 12-item index related to differences from IAS, and Bradshaw et al. (2004) 
use a 13-item index related to U.S. GAAP conformity.  The first two are country-level indexes while Bradshaw 
et al. (2004) is a firm-level index. 
8
  To expand on our quality categories, low quality (i.e., a score of 1) indicates that the firm disclosed the 
item but did not provide any additional discussion; medium quality (i.e., a score of 2) indicates that the firm 
disclosed the item and provided some additional discussion but did not compare their own results to an 
industrial average or to the results of competitive firms; and high quality (i.e., a score of 3) indicates that the 
firm disclosed the item, provided some additional discussion, and compared their own results to an industrial 
average or to the results of competitive firms.  
 To reduce subjectivity, we use the following procedures:  1) For each disclosure item, a pre-defined list 
of key words is used to search in annual reports.  2) If a disclosure item is found, the evaluater would read a few 
neighboring paragraphs containing the key words to determine whether 0, 1, 2 or 3 should be given.  3) In 
assigning a score, we define ‘discussion’ to mean that the annual report listed a breakdown of the required 
disclosure item, or listed or commented on the firm’s previous years’ figures or changes of the disclosed item. 
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As pointed out before, our intention is to measure voluntary disclosures at a broad 
level.  Thus, we are not specifically interested in disclosures about the firm’s international 
activities (e.g., geographic segment information).  There are two reasons for this.  First, our 
hypotheses are not about a particular type of disclosure; we predict a firm’s overall 
disclosures will be affected by globalization and legal environment.  Second, we want to 
minimize any supply-side effects.  Global firms may disclose more since they have more 
complex operations or financing arrangements that require greater disclosure.  Since our 
focus is on a market based explanation, we specifically exclude disclosures related to 
international activity in order to minimize any complexity effect.   
 
3.2 Test variables 
We measure globalization as a single concept which is consistent with the literature 
on multinationals (e.g., Duru and Reeb, 2001).  While our measure reflects interactions with 
foreign capital, product, and labor markets, we do not try to measure the effects of each of 
these markets separately.  Instead, we take the view that globalization can involve a variety 
of interrelated activities (e.g., a firm that operates in Australia may hire locals, have 
interactions with Australian customers, and raise funds from Australian creditors).  Thus, 
measures of globalization will be highly correlated. 
We use a composite measure of globalization that is based on three measures.  Based 
on Duru and Reeb, 2001; we use the foreign sales ratio (FSales) and the number of foreign 
subsidiaries (FSubs).9  Similar to Hope, 2003a; we use the number of foreign exchanges that 
                                                 
9
  Duru and Reeb (2001) use the number of geographic segments rather than number of foreign 
subsidiaries.  We use foreign subsidiaries because this reflects not only the extent of foreign operations but how 
they are organized.  Duru and Reeb (2001) also use the foreign asset ratio, but we exclude this since it would 
have significantly reduced our sample size.  Only 72% of firms in our sample report foreign assets. 
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a firm is listed on (FList).  We factor analyze the three variables and use the factor scores 
from the first factor to measure globalization (Global).   
We use hand-collected foreign activity data to augment data from Compustat because 
foreign activity data are available for only a limited number of non-U.S. firms on Compustat 
and other widely used databases.10  Specifically, we hand-collect data on foreign sales and 
foreign subsidiaries from the annual report, and we identify foreign listings by reviewing 
members of stock exchanges in each of our 30 countries using information from Datastream.  
As a result, we are able to examine the effects of globalization for a larger and more diverse 
sample of non-U.S. firms than prior studies have used. 
Lang et al. (2004) point out that there is no single, universally accepted measure of 
legal environment.  For our main tests, we use the most basic measure of legal environment, 
i.e., legal origin.  As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shliefer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) and 
subsequent research have shown, legal origin is powerful enough to explain differences in 
country-level characteristics such as investor protection, financial development, and 
ownership patterns.  We use a binary variable, Legal, that is coded 1 for common law 
countries and 0 for civil law countries to measure legal origin.  In additional tests, we use two 
alternative measures of legal environment.  First, we use a measure of investor protection 
from Leuz et al. (2003).  They identify three levels of investor protection from a cluster 
analysis based on nine institutional variables from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998).11  Second, we 
use a measure of securities law from Bushman and Piotroski (2006) that is based on measures 
                                                 
10
  We are able to obtain some foreign activity data using the geographic segment data provided on the 
Compustat North America database.  This is potentially available only for firms that are cross-listed in the U.S.   
11
  The nine variables are related to stock market capitalization, number of listed domestic firms relative to 
the population, number of IPOs relative to the population, ownership concentration, anti-director rights, 
disclosure, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, and corruption. 
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of private and public enforcement of securities law from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2006).12  Bushman and Piotroski (2006) use the arithmetic sum of the two indexes 
and classify countries as having either high or low enforcement. 
 
3.3  Control variables 
To control for other factors that might affect the level or quality of voluntary 
disclosures, we include controls for firm size, firm growth, financing needs, firm 
profitability, analyst following, and innate accrual quality.  We include firm size to control 
for disclosure costs, incentives for private information acquisition, and legal costs (e.g., Lang 
& Lundholm, 1993) where firm size is measured using the log of the market value of equity 
(lnMVE) (market value, MVE, is adjusted share price times adjusted shares outstanding from 
Compustat Global Issue).  We control for firm growth using the log of the book to market 
ratio (lnBM) (BM is Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial #146/MVE) (e.g., Bamber & 
Cheon, 1998)).  Capital intensity (CapInt) (#76/#89) and the leverage (Lev) (#106/#89) are 
included to control for financing needs, and we control for firm performance using the return 
on assets (ROA) (#32/#89) (e.g., Bushee & Leuz, 2005)).  Further, following Hope (2003a) 
and others, we control for analyst following (Analysts) calculated from IBES.  Based on prior 
literature, we expect a positive coefficient for each of these control variables. 
In addition, Francis et al. (2007) find a complementary relation between innate 
information quality and voluntary disclosures using U.S. data.  That is, as the fundamental 
quality of the information improves, managers provide more voluntary disclosure.   They 
                                                 
12
  La Porta et al.’s (2006) measure of public enforcement is based on four indexes related to supervisor 
attributes, investigative powers, stop and do orders, and criminal sanctions.  Their measure of private 
enforcement is based on two indexes related to disclosure and burden of proof (the disclosure index used by La 
Porta et al. (2006) is based on disclosure requirements related to issuing securities and is not a measure of 
accounting disclosures).   
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suggest that since innate accrual quality is a primitive construct of voluntary disclosure, tests 
that ignore innate accrual quality are likely to be confounded.  Further controlling for 
earnings quality in an international context can be important because prior studies such as 
Hung (2001) find that accounting quality can differ between countries.  Consequently, we 
also control for innate accrual quality. 
We adopt an approach developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols 
(2002) and estimate the following regression: 
CurAcct/At = α + β1CFOt-1/At + β2CFOt/At + β3CFOt+1/At + β4∆REVt/At + β5PPEt/At +ε    (1) 
where CurAcc is total current accruals in year t (change in current assets [Compustat Global 
Industrial /Commerical#75] – change in current liabilities [#104] – change in cash [#60] + 
change in short-term debt [#94]); A is average total assets in year t and t-1 (#89); CFO is cash 
flow from operations in year t, which is net income (#32) less total accruals (TAC) (change in 
current assets [#75] – change in current liabilities [#104] – change in cash [#60] + change in 
short-term debt [#94] – depreciation [#11]).  ∆REV is change in revenues (#1) in year t-1 to 
year t.  PPE is gross value of property, plant and equipment (#77) in year t.13 
 We estimate equation (1) on a time-series basis for each firm based on data for the 
period 1993-2004 which is the maximum number of years available on the Compustat Global 
database.  Because computation of the lagged CFO requires two lag years and because 
computation of the year-ahead CFO requires one lead year, we use nine years (1995-2003) to 
estimate equation (1).  We take the standard deviation of the residuals for firm i over the nine 
years as an estimate of total accrual quality (TAQ).   
                                                 
13
  Consistent with prior research (e.g., Francis et al., 2005, Kothari et al., 2005), throughout our analyses, 
we winsorize all distributions to the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
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Following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2007), we regress TAQ on a 
series of innate factors, i.e.: 
TAQ = α + β1Size + β2σCFO + β3σSales + β4OpCyc + β5NegEarn + ε (2) 
where Size is the log of average total assets (#89); σCFO is the standard deviation of CFO, 
scaled by total assets; σSales is the standard deviation of sales revenue (#1), scaled by total 
assets; OpCyc is the average of sum of accounts receivable days and inventory days (based 
on #1, #4, #63, #66); and NegEarn is the number of years of negative earnings (#32).  We 
then use the predicted values from equation (2) as estimates of innate accrual quality (IAQ).14  
Since large values of IAQ indicate poorer innate accrual quality, we expect a negative 
relation between IAQ and VDisc (VDiscQ). 
 
3.4  Model 
We estimate the following regression model to test H1 and H2: 
VDisc (VDiscQ) = α + β1Global + β2Legal + β3Global*Legal + β4IAQ + β5lnMVE + β6lnBM 
+ β7CapInt + β8Lev + β9ROA + β10Analysts + ε (3) 
where β1 and β3 test H1 and H2 respectively.  We expect a positive coefficient for β1 and a 
negative coefficient for β3. 
 
3.5  Sample 
 We select our sample in a two-step process.  As a first step, we identify all firms on 
the Compustat Global database that have data for all the variables in our tests except for data 
                                                 
14
  Francis et al. (2007) find that the significance of most of their traditional control variables (e.g., firm 
size, log of the book-to-market ratio) decreases when innate accrual quality is included in a regression model 
explaining voluntary disclosure.  They argue that innate accrual quality subsumes the explanatory power since 
innate accrual quality is based on similar characteristics.  Since not much is known about innate accrual quality 
in an international context, we include both innate accrual quality and the traditional control variables in our 
models.  
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on foreign sales, foreign subsidiaries, and foreign listings (we collect the bulk of our foreign 
activity data from other sources, primarily annual reports).   We find that 854 firms from 49 
countries satisfy this criterion.  The data requirement for IAQ is by far the most limiting since 
it requires 11 years of data.  Thus, our sample consists of long-lived, surviving firms.  While 
we acknowledge that this introduces a bias that can reduce the generalizability of our results, 
it also helps us in two ways:  (1) It increases homogeneity in our sample which reduces the 
possibility of omitted variables (e.g., start-up firms or younger firms may be fundamentally 
different from our firms), and (2) it increases the likelihood that at least some of our firms 
will be highly globalized since establishing an international presence takes time.  
 As a second step, we search the Internet for usable annual reports for the 854 firms.   
We use the 2003 annual report, but in 39 cases the 2003 report was not available so we use 
the 2002 (20 firms) or 2004 (19 firms) report instead.  Thus, we are able to obtain annual 
reports for 750 of the initial 854 companies.  Of these, 49 were not in English, and these were 
deleted.15  Clearly, this also affects the generalizability of our results.  At best, our results can 
only be extended to companies that report in English.  Further, we delete another 58 firms 
that did not have data on foreign sales available through Compustat Global or through their 
annual reports.16  After deleting the non-English reports and firms without foreign sales data, 
we have a final sample of 643 firms from 30 countries. 
 One consideration with hand-collected disclosure data is that because the process is 
time intensive, sample sizes are often small.  For example, Botosan (1997) uses hand-
                                                 
15
  Of the 49 non-English reports, 38 were in Japanese, 5 in Portugese, 5 in Spanish, and 1 in French. 
16
  In the final sample, we have 565 firms with foreign activity data from the annual report and 78 firms 
with foreign activity data from the Compustat North America database (as pointed out in footnote 12, the 
Compustat data are potentially available only for firms cross-listed in the U.S.).  When we have both annual 
report and Compustat data, we use the annual report amounts to verify the Compustat amounts.  In a few cases 
where amounts were not the same, we use the annual report amounts in our tests. 
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collected data for a sample of 122 manufacturing firms, and Guo, Lev, and Zhou (2004) use 
hand-collected data for a sample of 49 biotech firms.17  Our sample size compares favorably 
with Francis et al. (2007) who with 681 firms have one of the largest samples with hand-
collected disclosure data.   
 Further, our sample also compares favorably with recent cross-country studies that 
use externally developed indexes.  For example, Khanna et al. (2004) use a sample of 794 
firms from 24 countries, Francis et al. (2005) use 672 firms from 34 countries, and Durnev 
and Kim (2005) use two samples – one of 494 firms from 24 countries that are included in 
the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia governance ratings and another of 573 companies from 
16 countries that have S&P’s transparency and disclosure scores.  Thus, even though we use 
hand-collected data, we do not have to compromise on sample size.   
 
4.  Results 
4.1  Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses 
 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the sample by country.  Our sample includes firms 
from 30 countries, 11 common law countries and 19 civil law countries.  While the number 
of common law countries is less, common law countries are represented by more firms in our 
sample than civil law countries.  Overall, we have 494 firms from common law countries 
(76.8% of the sample) and 149 firms from civil law countries (23.2%).  Also, 40.1% of the 
sample comes from just two common law countries, i.e., the UK (25%) and Canada (15.1%).  
To address concerns that these countries might be driving our results, we report sensitivity 
tests with the UK and Canadian firms omitted. 
                                                 
17
  We recognize that both Botosan (1997) and Guo et al. (2004) collect more extensive data for each firm 
than we do. 
  21 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 3, panel A provides descriptive statistics for VDisc and VDiscQ.  VDisc has a 
mean of 3.484 and a median of 3.  The minimum is 0 which indicates that none of the 11 
disclosure items were disclosed.  The maximum is 9 which indicates that nine of the 11 items 
were provided.  Thus, based on our index, generally the level of voluntary disclosure is 
modest, but some firms disclose at high levels.  Further, the mean (median) for our voluntary 
disclosure quality index, VDiscQ, is 5.961 (5.000).  The maximum for VDiscQ is 17 from a 
theoretical maximum of 33 (i.e., 11 items times a maximum of 3 per item) which suggests 
that none of the firms in our sample are achieving both a high quantity and high quality of 
voluntary disclosures. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3, panels B and C provide more detail on the composition and distribution of 
VDisc.  Panel B shows the frequency of disclosure by item.  The most commonly disclosed 
items are number of employees (disclosed by 87.6% of firms), average compensation 
(64.2%), and units sold (47.2%).  The least common are the percentage of items sold that 
were designed or introduced in the last 3-5 years (3.6%), residual income (4.5%), and the 
cost of capital (5.8%).  Table 3, panel C contains a breakdown of the sample by VDisc.  The 
largest percentage of firms have disclosure scores of 2 (25.8%), followed by 18.8% with a 
score of 3. 
Table 3, panel D provides descriptives for VDisc by country.  For common law 
countries, means for VDisc vary from 1.50-4.80.  For civil law countries, means for VDisc 
vary from 2.00-9.00.  The purpose of panel D is to give an indication of the range of VDisc 
both within and between countries, but it is only illustrative.  Even though voluntary 
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disclosures appear to be higher in civil law countries, such a conclusion is unwarranted since 
panel D compares the raw scores without controlling for other firm characteristics that affect 
disclosures. 
Table 3, panel E presents descriptives for the remaining variables.  Of particular 
interest are the globalization variables.  The mean (median) for FSale is 0.398 (0.302) which 
indicates that, on average, almost 40% of sales for our sample are foreign sourced.  The mean 
for FSub is 17.456 foreign subsidiaries, but this is influenced by outliers as the median for 
FSub is 5.  Also, the mean (median) for FList is 1.409 (1).  While most firms have at least 
one foreign listing, FList varies from 0-7 so some firms have numerous foreign listings. 
Table 4 contains results of the factor analysis of the three global variables.  Table 4, 
panel A shows that the three globalization variables are positively correlated with r’s ranging 
from 0.350 to 0.397.  Table 4, panel B indicates that there is one common component with 
significant explanatory power (i.e., an eigenvalue exceeding 1), and we use the factor score 
from this component to represent globalization, Global.  Final loadings (Table 4, panel C) 
show that this factor loads most heavily on FList, but all loadings are similar and exceed 
0.723.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 5 provides the pairwise correlations for the independent variables.  Based on 
the Pearson correlations (the Spearman correlations are similar), Legal is negatively and 
significantly related to Global, lnMVE, and Analysts.  This indicates that civil law firms in 
the sample are more internationally diversified, are larger, and have a larger analyst 
following than common law firms in the sample.  To an extent, this is because the civil law 
sample contains few firms per country which suggests that civil law firms in the sample will 
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be the bigger, more established ones in those countries.  On the other hand, Global is 
positively and significantly correlated with lnMVE, Lev, Analysts, and is negatively and 
significantly correlated with lnBM and CapInt.  Thus, firms with greater foreign involvement 
are larger and have more leverage, a larger analyst following, higher growth, and lower 
capital intensity than firms with less foreign involvement.  Also, it is worth noting that firm 
size is significantly correlated with all of the other independent variables. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
4.2 Regression results 
We use equation (3) to test the validity of the two hypotheses simultaneously.  Table 
6 presents the main results using two alternative dependent variables, VDisc and VDiscQ.  
Both models have reasonable explanatory power with R2’s of 20.3% and 20.9%, respectively.  
Since the results for the two models are similar, we discuss them simultaneously.  In both 
models, Global is positive and significant at least at the 0.05 level based on a one-tailed test.  
Consistent with H1, voluntary disclosure is increasing in globalization.  This is consistent 
with the view that foreign involvement creates incentives for firms to improve their 
disclosures.   
Consistent with H2, we find that the interaction between globalization and legal 
environment, i.e., Global*Legal, is significant at the 0.01 level and negatively signed.  This 
indicates that for the same level of globalization, there is less (more) voluntary disclosure for 
firms based in common law (civil law) countries.  This supports two non-mutually exclusive 
views: either globalization increases the benefits of disclosure for firms from weak legal 
environment countries by exposing them to new markets where disclosure is more highly 
  24 
valued or that firms from weak legal environment countries need to provide better 
governance and more disclosures to overcome concerns about the weak laws and institutions 
that they face at home.   
Insert Table 6 about here 
Based on our coding, the coefficient for Global represents the incremental effect of 
globalization on voluntary disclosures for civil law based firms.  The combined coefficients 
for Global and Global*Legal represent the incremental effect of disclosure for common law 
based firms.  When VDisc is the dependent variable, the combined coefficient (i.e., 0.307 + [-
0.402] = -0.095) is not significant (t = -1.13) which indicates that globalization has no effect 
on voluntary disclosure in common law countries.  This is consistent with the view that 
common law firms already face pressure to disclose at high level.  When VDiscQ is the 
dependent variable, the combined coefficient for common law firms is significant but 
negative (i.e., 0.560 + [-1.073] = -0.613, t = -2.50).  It is not clear to us why the quality of 
voluntary disclosures for common law firms might decrease as globalization increases.  We 
suggest this as an area for future research.   
We also compute the F-statistic to test the joint explanatory power of Global and 
Global*Legal.  The F-statistic is 3.468 for the VDisc model which is significant at the 5% 
level (two-tailed).   The F-statistic is 5.983 for the VDiscQ model which is significant at the 
1% level (two-tailed).  Together, this shows that Global and Global*Legal are not redundant 
variables and that they provide explanatory power that is incremental to Legal and the other 
control variables.        
For the control variables, all are significant and correctly signed except for Legal and 
IAQ.  Thus, voluntary disclosure, whether measured based on quantity only (VDisc) or 
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quantity and quality (VDiscQ), is positively related to growth, firm size, capital intensity, 
leverage, ROA, and analyst following.  This is consistent with most of the prior research.  On 
the other hand, Legal is not significant in either model.  Thus, other things equal, voluntary 
disclosures do not differ between common and civil law country firms.  This is contrary to 
Jaggi and Low (2000) and Hope (2003b) who both find that disclosures are higher in 
common law countries.  However, both of these studies use the CIFAR ratings which include 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures so their results may be capturing differences in 
mandatory disclosures across countries.  Including mandatory disclosures in the index is 
inappropriate because mandatory disclosures and legal origin will be highly correlated since 
mandatory disclosures reflect accounting standards and common law countries have more 
rigorous accounting standards.  Also, our results are different from Francis et al. (2007) who 
find that IAQ is more highly related to their voluntary disclosure measure than their control 
variables which include firm size, growth, analyst following, and ROA.18   
We consider whether our results are sensitive to the way we measure legal 
environment.  As mentioned above, we use two alternative measures for legal environment, 
i.e., a measure of investor protection from Leuz et al. (2003) and a measure of securities law 
enforcement from Bushman and Piotroski (2006).   Table 7 provides the results.  For Table 7, 
panel A, we code investor protection (InvPro) equal to 2 if the firm’s home country is in 
Leuz et al.’s (2003) high investor protection cluster, equal to 1 if the firm’s home country is 
                                                 
18
  One reason for the difference is that accrual quality may not be a good measure of earnings quality 
(Wysocki, 2005).  Wysocki (2005) argues that the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure, which 
Francis et al. (2007) adopt, is dominated a negative contemporaneous correlation between cash flows and 
accruals and that it randomly decomposes accruals.  If so, it is possible that Francis et al.’s (2007) results are 
spurious.  Alternatively, it is possible that the problems Wysocki (2005) identifies are intensified when using 
cross-country data, making IAQ a much noisier measure when used in an international context (Francis et al. 
(2004) only examine U.S. firms).  
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in their medium investor protection cluster, and equal to 0 if the firm’s home country is in 
their low investor protection cluster.  The results are similar to our main results.  Whether we 
use VDisc or VDiscQ, Global is positive and significant which supports H1, and 
Global*InvPro is negative and significant which supports H2.19   
Insert Table 7 about here 
For Table 7, panel B, we code securities law enforcement (SecLaw) equal to 1 if a 
firm’s home country is listed as a high securities law enforcement country using data 
provided in Bushman and Piotroski (2006, Appendix 2).  Our results are again similar to the 
main results.  Both H1 and H2 are support.  Combined, the results in Table 7 indicate that our 
results are robust to different definitions of legal environment. 
We also consider the possibility that the legal environment in the firm’s host country 
might matter since, in addition to the home country’s legal environment, the legal 
environment in the host country may have an impact on voluntary disclosures as well.  To 
examine this, we include an additional control variable, Host, which captures the legal 
environment in the firm’s primary host country.  Host is equal to 1 if the firm’s host country 
is a common law country and 0 otherwise..   
Table 8 contains these results.  When VDisc is the dependent variable, Host is not 
significant.  When VDiscQ is the dependent variable, Host is positive and significant at the 
0.10 level.  Thus, this suggests that while the host country’s legal environment does not 
affect the level of voluntary disclosures, it does have a positive impact on the quality of those 
disclosures.  More importantly, our results for H1 and H2 are unchanged when Host is 
included.  Thus, controlling for Host, we continue to find that voluntary disclosures increase 
                                                 
19
  We find the coefficient for InvPro has t-values that reach statistical significance based on two-tailed 
tests, but since they are incorrectly signed, they are not significant in our one-tailed tests.   
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as the firm becomes more global and that this increase is more pronounced for firms based in 
civil law countries. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
We conduct additional robustness checks.  First, we include an additional control 
variable for a U.S. listing since FList does not differentiate between U.S. and other foreign 
listings.  There is a considerable literature that examines the effects of cross-listing in the 
U.S. (e.g., Reese & Weisbach, 2002; Lang et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2003; Doidge, 2004), and 
Khanna et al. (2004) find that a U.S. listing is positively related to the S&P’s disclosure 
ratings for their sample of non-U.S. firms.  Thus, we examine whether our globalization 
variable is simply proxying for a U.S. listing effect.  Second, to consider whether our results 
are driven by unspecified industry factors, we estimate equation (3) with fixed industry 
effects.  Third, because financial firms have different disclosures from non-financial firms 
and because their disclosures are highly regulated, we re-run our tests with the financial firms 
omitted.  Our results for these analyses (untabulated) are qualitatively the same as our main 
results.  Fourth, we noted before that over 40% of the sample is composed of UK firms 
(25%) and Canadian (15.1%).  Thus, it is possible that our results might be driven by country 
effects involving one or both of these countries.  Thus, we estimate models based on two 
reduced samples, one where we delete the UK firms and one where we delete both the UK 
and Canadian firms.  Again, our results are similar to the prior results so even with 40.1% of 
the sample omitted, we continue to find support for H1 and H2.20  Fifth, since our dependent 
variables are positive by design and are constrained to a specific range, it is possible that the 
                                                 
20
  We also examine the effect of countries with small representations by re-estimating our models with 
countries with 5 or less firms omitted.  Our results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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assumption of normality may be violated.  If so, our OLS estimates may be inconsistent and 
inefficient.  We find our results (untabulated) are robust when we estimate our main models 
using tobit.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
This study uses hand-collected data on disclosures and foreign activity for a sample of 
643 non-U.S. firms from 30 countries.  We find that voluntary disclosures are positively 
related to the degree of globalization and are negatively related to the interaction between 
globalization and the legal environment in the firm’s home country.  Our research suggests 
that globalization is an important variable that has been largely overlooked by prior cross-
country studies that examine the effects of country-level institutions.  This has significant 
implications for future research since firms are becoming increasingly global and markets are 
becoming more integrated. 
Our results indicate that the effects of globalization are most pronounced for firms 
from weak legal environments.  There are two non-mutually exclusive explanations.  First, 
globalization can increase the benefits of disclosure by exposing firms from weaker legal 
environments to new markets where disclosure is more highly valued.  Second, as firms from 
these countries globalize, they need to provide better governance and extra disclosure to 
build trust and enhance their reputation.  That is, because users unfamiliar with the firm may 
have concerns about the weak laws and institutions in the firm’s home country and the poorer 
quality of its financial reporting, firms from weak legal environments have incentives to 
provide better disclosure to alleviate these concerns as they become more international. 
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Our results also contribute to the debate about convergence of corporate governance 
systems.  On one hand, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) argue that globalization will drive 
firms to adopt similar corporate governance systems (e.g., Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001).  
On the other hand, Bebchuk and Roe (1999) argue that  corporate governance systems are 
path dependent and are unlikely to change even as globalization occurs (e.g., Bebchuk & 
Roe, 1999).   Our results support an intermediate view – globalization can affect corporate 
governance systems, but mainly for those firms domiciled in weak legal environment 
countries. 
We offer a few caveats.  Most notably, our sample is biased toward long-lived 
surviving firms that report in English.  This affects the generalizability of our results.  Also, 
we use a self-constructed voluntary disclosure index.  Thus, it is less objective than an 
externally developed index, and it is harder for other researchers to replicate.  Further, 
because of the labor intensity of collecting the data, we only can provide evidence from one 
period.  As a result, we cannot be sure that our results are not time-specific. 
Our research could be extended in several ways.  First, our design could be extended 
to other types of investor focused communications such as media releases or conference 
calls.  Second, using a time-series analysis would help develop a stronger causal link between 
globalization and voluntary disclosures.   Third, if finer proxies can be developed, one could 
explore the relative effects of capital, product, and labor market involvement on voluntary 
disclosures.  Fourth, and perhaps most important, globalization could be included in other 
tests that use cross-country differences in legal environment as an explanatory variable.  For 
example, it would be worth examining whether accounting properties such as conservatism 
are a function of both legal environment and globalization. 
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Table 1 
Coding scheme used to compute VDISC 
 
 
1.   Other Financial Measures 
 a.   Free cash flow (or cash flow other than those reported in the Statement of Cash Flows) 
 b. Economic profit, residual income type measure 
 c. Cost of capital (WACC, hurdle rate, EVA target rate) 
  
2.   Non-Financial Measures 
 a.   Number of employees 
 b. Average compensation per employee 
 c. Percentage of sales or services designed or introduced in past 3-5 years 
 d. Market share 
 e. Units sold (or other output measure, e.g., production, customers serviced) 
 f. Unit selling price (or other price measure, e.g., hourly rate) 
 g. Growth in units sold (or growth in other output measure) 
 h. Growth in investment (expansion plans, number of outlets, etc.) 
   
 
Based on Francis et al. (2007).  
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Table 2 
Sample firms by country 
 
   
Country Frequency % 
   
Argentina 3 0.47 
Australia§ 47 7.31 
Austria 1 0.16 
Belgium 2 0.31 
Brazil 14 2.18 
Canada§ 97 15.09 
Chile 3 0.47 
Denmark 3 0.47 
Finland 7 1.09 
France 19 2.95 
Germany 18 2.8 
Hong Kong§ 43 6.69 
India 6 0.93 
Ireland§ 6 0.93 
Israel§ 4 0.62 
Japan 37 5.75 
Korea 4 0.62 
Malaysia§ 56 8.71 
Mexico 1 0.16 
Netherlands 5 0.78 
New Zealand§ 7 1.09 
Philippines 4 0.62 
Singapore§ 28 4.35 
Sweden 4 0.62 
Thailand§ 40 6.22 
Taiwan 1 0.16 
South Africa§ 5 0.78 
Spain 1 0.16 
Switzerland 16 2.49 
United Kingdom§ 161 25.04 
Total 643 100.00 
   
 
§ Denotes common law country.  Country classifications are based on La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer; and Vishny, 1998).  
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
 
     Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum  Median  Maximum 
           
VDisc    3.484  1.867  0.000  3.000  9.000 
VDiscQ    5.961  3.690  0.000  5.000  17.000 
  
Panel B. Frequencies by item for VDisc and VDiscQ 
 
    VDisc  VDiscQ 
Item    = 0  = 1  = 1  = 2  = 3 
           
Free cash flows    540  103  33  70  0 
Residual income    614  29  6  23  0 
Cost of capital    606  37  15  22  0 
Number of employees     80  563  184  379  0 
Avg. compensation    230  413  244  169  0 
Percentage in last 3-5 years 620  23  13  9  1 
Market share    476  167  60  79  28 
Units sold    339  304  66  226  12 
Unit price    513  130  24  98  8 
Sales growth    413  230  34  190  6 
Investment growth    402  241  16  225  0 
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Panel C. Distribution of firms by VDisc score 
 
Item      N  %     
           
0      27  4.2%     
1      40  6.2%     
2      166  25.8%     
3    
 
 
121 
 
18.8% 
 
 
  
4    
 
 
96 
 
14.9% 
 
 
  
5 
 
 97  15.1%     
6    
 
 
56 
 
8.7% 
 
 
  
7      26  4.0%     
8      8  1.2%     
9      6  0.9%     
10      0  0.0%     
11          0  0.0%     
Total      643       
 
Panel D. Descriptive statistics for VDisc by country 
 
     Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum  Median  Maximum 
 
Common law countries           
Australia    2.936  1.405  0.000  3.000  6.000 
Canada    3.289  1.984  0.000  3.000  8.000 
Hong Kong    3.163  2.023  0.000  3.000  7.000 
Ireland    3.000  1.095  2.000  3.000  5.000 
Israel    1.750  0.500  1.000  2.000  2.000 
Malaysia    3.411  1.581  1.000  3.000  7.000 
New Zealand    2.857  2.734  0.000  1.000  7.000 
Singapore    3.821  2.195  1.000  3.000  9.000 
South Africa    4.800  1.789  2.000  6.000  6.000 
Thailand    3.550  1.894  0.000  3.000  7.000 
United Kingdom    3.379  1.427  0.000  3.000  7.000 
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Civil law countries             
Argentina    5.000  1.732  3.000  6.000  6.000 
Austria    9.000  0.000  9.000  9.000  9.000 
Belgium    4.500  2.121  3.000  4.500  6.000 
Brazil    5.071  2.165  0.000  5.000  8.000 
Chile    3.667  0.577  3.000  4.000  4.000 
Denmark    4.333  0.577  4.000  4.000  5.000 
Finland    3.571  2.992  0.000  2.000  9.000 
France    4.263  2.104  1.000  4.000  9.000 
Germany    5.278  2.244  2.000  5.000  9.000 
Indonesia    3.167  1.602  2.000  2.500  6.000 
Japan    2.703  1.927  0.000  2.000  8.000 
Korea    2.750  2.754  0.000  2.500  6.000 
Mexico    5.000  0.000  5.000  5.000  5.000 
Netherlands    4.800  1.483  3.000  5.000  7.000 
Philippines    2.500  1.732  1.000  2.500  4.000 
Spain    4.000  0.000  4.000  4.000  4.000 
Sweden    5.500  1.291  4.000  5.500  7.000 
Switzerland    4.250  1.807  0.000  4.500  7.000 
Taiwan    2.000  0.000  2.000  2.000  2.000 
             
 
Panel E. Descriptive statistics for other variables 
 
     Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum  Median  Maximum 
             
Legal    0.770  0.421       
 
Globalization variables          
FSale    0.398  0.378  0.000  0.302  1.000 
FSub    17.456  34.040  0.000  5.000  218.000 
FList    1.409  1.672  0.000  1.000  7.000 
 
Control variables             
IAQ    0.019  0.011  0.002  0.016  0.054 
  39 
lnMVE    6.415  2.162  1.571  6.381  13.292 
lnBM    -0.515  1.050  -6.261  -0.422  1.373 
CapInt    0.355  0.226  0.007  0.332  0.867 
Lev    0.149  0.129  0.000  0.135  0.500 
ROA    0.037  0.082  -0.383  0.040  0.259 
Analysts    8.238  9.813  0.000  5.000  45.000 
             
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the two alternative dependent variables which are defined as follows: 
 VDisc  = sum of item scores for 11 voluntary disclosure items shown in Table 1 where an item score is 0 for nondisclosure, 1 for 
disclosure; 
 VDiscQ = sum of item quality scores for 11 voluntary disclosure items shown in Table 1 where an item quality score is 0 for 
nondisclosure, 1 for disclosure of low quality, 2 for disclosure of medium quality, and 3 for disclosure of high quality. 
VDisc and VDiscQ are based on the 2003 annual report except in 39 cases where the 2003 report was not available.  In these cases, the 2002 (20 
firms or 2004 (19 firms) report is used instead. 
Panel B provides frequencies for the disclosure items on an item-by-item basis.  The ‘= 0’ column represents the number of firms (out of 643) 
that did not disclose that item.  The ‘= 1’ column represents the number of firms (out of 643) that did disclose that item. 
Panel C provides a breakdown of sample firms by VDisc score (defined as above).  The maximum score for VDisc is 9 out of a theoretical 
maximum of 11.  No firms in the sample have a score of 10 or 11. 
Panel D provides descriptive statistics for VDisc (defined above) for every country in the sample.  Panel D is divided into common law 
countries and civil law countries where country classifications are based on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer; and Vishny, 1998). 
Panel E provides descriptive statistics for the other individual variables used in the study.   The variables are defined as follows: 
 Legal = 1, if firm is based in common law country; 0, if based in civil law country where country classifications are based on La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer; and Vishny, 1998); 
 FSale =  foreign sales/total sales (hand-collected from annual report or Compustat Global Issue); 
 FSubs = number of foreign subsidiaries (hand-collected from annual report); 
 FList =  number of foreign stock exchanges that a firm is listed on (from Datastream); 
 IAQ =  innate accrual quality which is estimated as described below; 
 lnMVE = log of market value of equity (adjusted share price x adjusted shares outstanding, from Compustat Global Issue) at the end of 
2003 in U.S. dollars; 
 lnBM =  ratio of log of the book value of equity (Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial #146) to market value of equity at the end 
of 2003; 
 CapInt =  net plant, property, and equipment (#76)/total assets (#89) at the end of 2003; 
 Lev = total debt (#106)/total assets (#89) at the end of 2003; 
 ROA =  net income (#32)/total assets (#89) at the end of 2003; 
 Analysts = number of analysts following the firm (from IBES) at the end of 2003. 
We compute IAQ as follows.  We first estimate the regression: 
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CurAcct/At = α + β1CFOt-1/At + β2CFOt/At + β3CFOt+1/At + β4∆REVt/At + β5PPEt/At +ε     (1)
  
where CurAcc is total current accruals in year t (change in current assets [Compustat Global Industrial/Commerical #75] – change in current 
liabilities [#104] – change in cash [#60] + change in short-term debt [#94]); A is average total assets in year t and t-1 (#89); and CFO is cash 
flow from operations in year t is net income (#32) less total accruals (TAC) (change in current assets [#75] – change in current liabilities [#104] 
– change in cash [#60] + change in short-term debt [#94] – depreciation [#11]).  ∆REV is change in revenues (#1) in year t-1 to year t.  PPE is 
gross value of property, plant and equipment (#77) in year t.  Using data for the period 1995-2003, we estimate the above equation on a time-
series basis for each firm.  The standard deviation of the residuals for firm i is used as an estimate of total accrual quality (TAQ).  We then 
regress TAQ on firm size (#89), CFO scaled by total assets (#89), standard deviation of sales revenue (#1), operating cycle (i.e., the sum of 
accounts receivable days and inventory days [based on #1, #4, #63, #66]), and the number of years with negative earnings (#32).  We use the 
predicted values from the second regression as a measure of innate accrual quality (IAQ) where high values of IAQ indicate poor innate accrual 
quality. 
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Table 4 
Results of factor analysis of three global diversification variables 
 
 
Panel A. Pearson correlation matrix 
 
   
  FSales  FSubs FList  
FSales 1.000    
FSubs 0.378 1.000   
FList 0.350 0.397 1.000  
 
Panel B. Total variance explained 
 
   
Component Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative % 
1 1.668 55.616 55.616 
2 0.708 23.613 79.229 
3 0.623 20.771 100.000 
    
 
Panel C. Factor loadings for Global 
 
  
 Variable Loading  
 FSales 0.723  
 FSubs 0.739  
 FList 0.775  
    
 
Panel A provides Pearson correlations for three measures of globalization, FSales, FSubs, and FList which 
are defined in Table 3.   
Panel B provides results from a factor analysis of the three measures.  Three components are extracted with 
only one component with an eigenvalue in excess of 1. Factor scores for the first factor are used as a 
composite measure of globalization, and this variable is labelled Global.   
Panel C provides the factor loadings for Global.   
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Table 5 
Pairwise correlations among the independent variables 
 
 Legal Global IAQ lnBM lnMVE CapInt Lev 
 
ROA 
 
Analysts 
          
Legal 
 
-0.207*** 0.259* -0.003 -0.354*** 0.031 -0.061 0.054 -0.153*** 
Global 
-0.258***  
-0.280*** -0.202*** 0.499*** -0.078** 0.207*** -0.124*** 0.316*** 
IAQ 0.241*** 0.265***  0.151*** -0.694*** -0.164*** -0.189*** -0.273*** -0.474*** 
lnBM 0.119 -0.133*** -0.074*  
-0.476*** 0.010 -0.040 -0.410*** -0.390*** 
lnMVE 
-0.391*** 0.505*** -0.612*** -0.538***  0.083 0.278*** 0.200*** 0.662*** 
CapInt 
 0.052 -0.118*** -0.164*** 0.007 0.078*  0.218*** 0.001 0.059 
Lev 
-0.035 0.152*** -0.144*** -0.063 0.215*** 0.239***  
-0.223*** 0.224*** 
ROA 
-0.048 -0.060 -0.374*** -0.229*** 0.277*** 0.041 -0.152***  0.153*** 
Analysts 
-0.156*** 0.362*** -0.361*** -0.210*** 0.539*** 0.035 0.140*** 0.155***  
          
 
Pearson correlations are presented below the diagonal.  Spearman correlations are presented above the diagonal.   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 6 
Regression results 
 
 
 
Variables VDisc VDiscQ 
     
Intercept 0.752 1.39 0.584 0.55 
H1. Global (+) 0.307 2.33*** 0.560 2.16** 
Legal (+) 0.055 0.31 -0.277 -0.79 
H2. Global*Legal (-) -0.402 -2.53*** -1.073 -3.43*** 
IAQ (-) 0.199 0.02 5.873 0.33 
lnBM (+) 0.193 2.27** 0.422 2.52*** 
lnMVE (+) 0.313 4.97*** 0.605 4.89*** 
CapInt (+) 1.015 3.27*** 2.521 4.12*** 
Lev (+) 1.364 2.47*** 2.595 2.38*** 
ROA (+) 2.092 2.23** 4.238 2.29*** 
Analysts (+) 0.012 1.45*   0.032 1.98** 
     
n 643 643 
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.209 
F-statistic 17.33*** 17.98*** 
   
 
This table provides estimates from the regression of voluntary disclosure on globalization, legal environment, the interaction of 
globalization and legal environment, and control variables.  The results in columns 2 and 3 are based on a model where VDisc is 
the dependent variable.  The results in columns 3 and 4 are based on a model where VDiscQ is the dependent variable.  All 
variables, except Global, are defined in Table 3.  Global is defined in Table 4.   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
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Table 7 
Regression results using alternative measure for legal origin 
 
 
Panel A. Investor protection 
 
Variables VDisc VDiscQ 
     
Intercept 1.424 2.61 2.510 2.34 
H1. Global (+) 0.415 1.92** 1.002 2.35*** 
InvPro (+) -0.182 -1.65 -0.866 -3.98 
H2. Global*InvPro (-) -0.211 -1.63* -0.660 -2.59*** 
IAQ (-) -0.390 -0.04 2.793 0.15 
lnBM (+) 0.216 2.17** 0.503 2.56*** 
lnMVE (+) 0.272 4.25*** 0.511 4.05*** 
CapInt (+) 0.978 3.08*** 2.503 4.00*** 
Lev (+) 1.088 1.92** 2.283 2.05** 
ROA (+) 2.150 2.20** 4.002 2.07** 
Analysts (+) 0.015 1.81**   0.042 2.52*** 
     
N 611 611 
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.207 
F-statistic 15.53*** 16.95*** 
 
Panel B. Securities law 
 
Variables VDisc VDiscQ 
     
Intercept 0.870 1.65 0.695 0.67 
H1. Global (+) 0.309 2.19** 0.393 1.41* 
SecLaw (+) -0.050 -0.28 -0.367 -1.04 
H2. Global*SecLaw (-) -0.372 -2.27** -0.727 -2.24** 
IAQ (-) 0.644 0.07 6.823 0.38 
lnBM (+) 0.202 2.39*** 0.469 2.80*** 
lnMVE (+) 0.309 5.03*** 0.616 5.07*** 
CapInt (+) 0.969 3.13*** 2.340 3.83*** 
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Lev (+) 1.335 2.41*** 2.457 2.25** 
ROA (+) 2.088 2.22** 4.259 2.29*** 
Analysts (+) 0.014 1.72**   0.038 2.33*** 
     
n 643 643 
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.201 
F-statistic 17.24*** 17.15*** 
   
 
Panel A provides estimates from the regression of voluntary disclosure on globalization, legal environment, the interaction of 
globalization and legal environment, and control variables.  The results in columns 2 and 3 are based on a model where VDisc is 
the dependent variable.  The results in columns 3 and 4 are based on a model where VDiscQ is the dependent variable.  All 
variables, except Global and InvPro are defined in Table 3.  Global is defined in Table 4.  InvPro is based on Leuz et al. (2003) 
who perform a cluster analysis on nine variables related to investor protection at the country-level.  The nine variables are related 
to stock market capitalization, number of listed domestic firms relative to the population, number of IPOs relative to the 
population, ownership concentration, anti-director rights, disclosure, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, and corruption.   
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003) identify three clusters of investor protection.  We code InvPro equal to 2 for firms from 
countries in their high investor protection cluster, equal to 1 for firms from countries in their medium investor protection cluster, 
and equal to 0 for firms in their low investor protection cluster. 
Panel B provides estimates from the regression of voluntary disclosure on legal environment and control variables.  The results in 
columns 2 and 3 are based on a model where VDisc is the dependent variable.  The results in columns 3 and 4 are based on a 
model where VDiscQ is the dependent variable. All variables, except Global and SecLaw, are defined in Table 3.  Global is 
defined in Table 4.  SecLaw is based on Bushman and Piotroski (2006).  Their measure is the arithmetic sum of two indexes of 
securities law enforcement developed by La Porta et al. (2006); one measuring public enforcement and the other measuring  
private enforcement.  La Porta et al. (2006) measure of public enforcement is based on four indexes related to supervisor 
attributes, investigative powers, stop and do orders, and criminal sanctions.  Their measure of private enforcement is based on two 
indexes related to disclosure and burden of proof.  SecLaw is a binary variable that is coded 1 for strong enforcement countries.  
Our values are from Bushman and Piotroski’s (2006) Appendix 2. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
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Table 8 
Regression results controlling for legal environment in primary host country 
 
 
 
Variables VDisc VDiscQ 
     
Intercept 0.766 1.41 0.634 0.59 
H1. Global (+) 0.287 2.13** 0.483 1.86** 
Legal (+) 0.067 0.38 -0.231 -0.66 
H2. Global*Legal (-) -0.408 -2.56*** -1.096 -3.50*** 
IAQ (-) -0.313 0.03 3.999 0.23 
lnBM (+) 0.190 2.23** 0.411 2.45*** 
lnMVE (+) 0.307 4.83*** 0.583 4.67*** 
CapInt (+) 0.991 3.17*** 2.432 3.96*** 
Lev (+) 1.333 2.40*** 2.479 2.27*** 
ROA (+) 2.043 2.17** 4.059 2.19*** 
Analysts (+) 0.011 1.36*   0.029 1.82** 
Host (+) 0.126 0.74 0.463 1.39* 
     
n 643 643 
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.210 
F-statistic 15.79*** 16.55*** 
   
 
This table provides estimates from the regression of voluntary disclosure on globalization, legal environment, the interaction of 
globalization and legal environment, and control variables.  The results in columns 2 and 3 are based on a model where VDisc is 
the dependent variable.  The results in columns 3 and 4 are based on a model where VDiscQ is the dependent variable.  All 
variables, except Global and Host, are defined in Table 3.  Global is defined in Table 4.  Host is defined as: 
 Host = .1 if the firm’s host country is a common law country and 0 otherwise. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
 
 
 
